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Abstract
The ability to swiftly and smoothly switch from one task set to another is central to intelligent behavior, because it allows an
organism to flexibly adapt to ever changing environmental conditions and internal needs. For this reason, researchers
interested in executive control processes have often relied on task-switching paradigms as powerful tools to uncover the
underlying cognitive and brain architecture. In order to gather fundamental information at the single-cell level, it would be
greatly helpful to demonstrate that non-human primates, especially the macaque monkey, share with us similar behavioral
manifestations of task-switching and therefore, in all likelihood, similar underlying brain mechanisms. Unfortunately, prior
attempts have provided negative results (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003b), in that it was reported that macaques do not show
the typical signature of task-switching operations at the behavioral level, represented by switch costs. If confirmed, this
would indicate that the macaque cannot be used as a model approach to explore human executive control mechanisms by
means of task-switching paradigms. We have therefore decided to re-explore this issue, by conducting a comparative
experiment on a group of human participants and two macaque monkeys, whereby we measured and compared
performance costs linked to task switching and resistance to interference across the two species. Contrary to what
previously reported, we found that both species display robust task switching costs, thus supporting the claim that
macaque monkeys provide an exquisitely suitable model to study the brain mechanisms responsible for maintaining and
switching task sets.
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Introduction
Due to the close proximity in evolutionary terms between the
two species, non-human primates are typically taken as almost
ideal models for studying cognitive functions of humans. Macaque
monkeys, in particular, have been widely used especially in
electrophysiological, functional neuroimaging and lesion studies
aiming to investigate the neural correlates of cognitive abilities
expressed by animals with psychological and behavioral reper-
toires similar to those of humans. A few fMRI studies have even
compared animal and human cognitive mechanisms directly by
measuring brain activations in both species while the respective
individuals were engaged in performing the same behavioral tasks
(e.g., [1]). Therefore, it appears that non-human primates have
provided a viable and valuable animal model for exploring several
aspects of non-verbal human cognition, including perception,
attention, memory, decision making, emotional-motivational
processing, and action planning, as well as the underlying brain
mechanisms.
Over the past several years, one of the major challenges within
human cognitive neuroscience has been to shed light on the
functioning and neural substrates of executive control processes.
Psychological and neurobiological conceptualizations refer to the
executive control system as an overarching system that coordinates
cognitive resources for flexibly adapting behavior to immediate
environmental demands and moment-to-moment needs of the
individual [2–8].
Switching at will from one cognitive task to another and the
consequent ability to rapidly select the appropriate course of
action by favoring task-relevant information in the face of
interfering distraction are fundamental components and manifes-
tations of executive control. It is precisely for this reason that task-
switching behavioral paradigms have become powerful and widely
used experimental tools for obtaining reliable operational
measures of such executive functions [9–14]. In typical task-
switching experiments, subjects perform blocks of mixed-task trials
in which they are instructed to switch randomly (or sometimes
regularly) between two or more different task rules, represented by
competing sets of pre-learned stimulus-response (S-R) associations
(task sets). Disengaging from, and preparing for, a particular task
set, as well as selecting task-relevant from task-irrelevant
information, both represent complex control operations which
take time and resources to the system and, consequently, can be
detected in the speed and accuracy of behavioral performance, in
the form of task-switching and interference costs. These costs are
operationally defined as the difference between the levels of
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Three types of task-switching costs have been characterized.
General cost refers to the increment in reaction times and error rate
on mixed-task blocks relative to blocks of trials in which only one
task is performed (single-task blocks) [11,15–19]. Mixing cost
represents a significant fraction of the previously defined general
cost and can be measured by specifically contrasting performance
on single-task trial blocks against performance on one particular
class of mixed-task trials, namely task-repeat trials. By definition,
mixed-task blocks include trials in which the task switches relative
to the previous trial (task-switch trials) and trials in which the task
is repeated (task-repeat trials). Mixing cost quantifies the
observation that performance on task-repeat trials, though
improving rapidly after a switch, never reaches the level of speed
and accuracy of single-task trials [20]. Remarkably, reaction time
and error rate decrease substantially on the first task-repeat trial,
whereas no additional improvement is detected over subsequent
repetitions [11]. Switch cost is a trial-specific effect and refers to the
worsening in performance associated with changing versus
repeating the task executed on the previous trial within mixed-
task blocks [11,12,17]. It has been sometimes argued that these
behavioral effects presumably reflect distinct levels and compo-
nents of cognitive control involved in task-switching operations
[14,21]. On the one hand, general and mixing costs might index
sustained control processes associated with keeping multiple task
sets active at the same time, or the division of general cognitive
resources between concurrently active task sets. On the other
hand, switch costs may be informative about transient executive
processes associated with the attentive monitoring of cues signaling
task change or maintenance and the rapid updating of current
goals.
As a well separate notion, interference cost refers to the competition
exerted by task-irrelevant information against the selection of task-
relevant information. In some task-switching designs, this cost can
be operationally measured by comparing performance in relation
to congruent versus incongruent bivalent stimuli. Bivalent (or two-
dimensional) stimuli are generally assigned with two task set-
specific meanings (e.g., colored oriented bars, with color and
orientation features prompting two alternative rules), which can be
congruent or incongruent in terms of the response required to the
subject. Behavioral studies reporting human interference cost have
shown that the selection of the currently task-relevant stimulus
feature is commonly more effortful (leading to longer reaction
times and higher error rates) on incongruent than congruent trials
(congruency effect) [10–12].
Although the role of prefrontal cortex in central executive
functions is of unquestioned importance, the brain circuitry
mediating control processes specifically involved in task-switching
remains incompletely understood. To date a number of functional
neuroimaging studies of executive control have focused on the
neural substrates of task-switching and interference behavioral
effects in humans [21–25]. In contrast, this specific issue has never
been addressed in non-human primates, including the macaque
monkey, since so far no suitable animal model for studying human
task-switching has ever been described in this species. As a
consequence, there are no reports in the literature of single-unit
recording data in the behaving monkey, which instead would
provide fine-scale information regarding the patterns of neural
activity associated with the maintenance and switching of task sets.
Indeed, some aspects of executive control closely relevant to
task-switching, such as perceptual categorization, associative
learning, abstract rule representation and behavioral flexibility,
have already been explored in non-human primates using single-
unit recording and lesion methods [1,26–33], which indicates that
these approaches can be particularly valuable for investigating
human high-order cognitive control functions. More importantly,
one comparative behavioral study has recently tackled the
question whether the macaque monkey can also provide an
appropriate model for human task-switching processes [34]. In the
reported experiment, both macaques and humans had to
randomly switch between two visual discrimination tasks, which
were performed on a set of congruent and incongruent bivalent
stimuli. The authors reported a modest degree of overlap in
behavioral performance costs between the two species. Monkeys
showed little or no switch cost and high interference cost, while the
opposite pattern was found in humans. This finding would suggest
that monkeys radically differ from humans with respect to at least
those cognitive processes, and related brain mechanisms, which
are responsible for changing task set and maintaining the focus of
attention on currently relevant stimulus features. With the present
study, we intended to explore further task-switching and
interference costs of human and non-human primates so as to
reveal inter-species behavioral differences and similarities, which
might eventually settle the question whether macaque monkeys
are suitable models for studying human executive control and its
underlying brain mechanisms. To anticipate, by comparing
performance of human and macaque subjects, we obtained
evidence that both species show robust task switching costs,
therefore supporting the claim that macaque monkeys provide an
exquisitely suitable model to study the brain mechanisms
responsible for maintaining and switching task sets.
Methods
The present study is reported according to the ARRIVE
guidelines on animal research
Participants. Two adult male Rhesus monkeys (Macaca
Mulatta, 10 and 8 years of age, weighing about 10 Kg) and eight
adult humans (1 male, between 26 and 32 years of age) took part
in the study. Use of the macaque monkeys was approved by the
University of Verona Committee for Animal Research (CIRSAL)
and by the Department for the Veterinary Public Health,
Nutrition and Food Security of the Italian Ministry of Health
(D.L. n. 116/1992, art. 8/9 and D.M. n. 53/2003-c, 04/04/
2003). The monkeys were housed and handled in strict accordance
with the Weatherall Report’s recommendations about good
animal practice and their wellbeing and health conditions were
constantly monitored by the institutional veterinary doctor.
A scleral search coil for eye position recording and a head-
restraint device for painless immobilization of the head were
implanted under aseptic conditions while the monkeys were
anesthetized (Domitor medetomidina 1 mg/ml, Orion Pharma,
Espoo, Finland). The veterinary doctor assisted the surgical
operation and closely monitored the animals both during surgery
and in the following days. Experiments resumed two weeks or the
time necessary after postoperative analgesics and antibiotics
administration.
The monkeys were habituated to the experimental routine and
the experimenter. While participating in this study, monkeys were
on water restriction and performed the experiment in exchange for
liquid reward, along the lines of operant conditioning. A minimum
daily level of fluid intake for adequate hydration was determined
separately for each animal and, if necessary, the amount of water
or juice acquired during the experimental session was supple-
mented by additional fluid upon returning the animal to the home
cage. Moreover, the body weight of the monkeys was monitored
daily to exclude excessive weight loss. These procedures were
closely supervised by our veterinary doctor.
Monkey as a Model for Human Executive Control
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e21489Apparatus and stimuli. Behavioral paradigm admin-
istration and data acquisition were monitored by a computer
running the ‘‘CORTEX’’ real-time control system (http://www.
cortex.salk.edu/). Experimental sessions took place in a sound-
attenuated, dark room. Stimuli were presented onto a computer
screen positioned 57 cm in front of the participants. Two different
feature-discrimination tasks were performed on a set of target
stimuli consisting of sixteen colored oriented-bars (2.9u60.5u),
resulting from the combination of four colors (red, green, blue and
yellow) and four orientations (vertical, horizontal and the two
orthogonal oblique orientations). Each feature value was
arbitrarily associated to either of two alternative motor responses
(the turning of a response lever in the clockwise or counter-
clockwise direction), according to the stimulus-response (S-R)
contingencies shown in Figure 1a. In the case of congruent stimuli,
both the color and the orientation of the stimulus were associated
to the same motor response, whereas in the case of incongruent
stimuli, color and orientation features of the given stimulus were
associated to incompatible responses. Either of two different
symbolic cues informed the subject about which task was to be
performed on the upcoming target stimulus.
Animals were seated in primate chairs and a juice spout was
placed next to their mouth for automated reward delivery in
return of correct behavioral performance. Both monkeys and
humans received acoustic feedback after correctly performed
trials.
Procedure. All subjects performed a cued task-switching
paradigm. At the beginning of each trial, either a color-task cue
(a circle) or an orientation-task cue (a triangle) instructed the
subject as to which component feature of the upcoming target
stimulus had to be discriminated while disregarding the other
feature of the same stimulus. Consequently, the task cue
indicated which of the two pre-learned sets of S-R associations
had to be implemented on the basis of the specified feature.
After stimulus onset, subjects had to turn the lever according to
t h er e s p o n s er e q u i r e db yt h ec u rrently attended feature value.
Obviously, before running the experimental sessions, monkeys
and humans had experienced different amounts of practice on
the relevant S-R mappings. Monkeys had received several
training sessions on each of four different subsets of the sixteen
target stimuli (Figure 1b), while humans, after being verbally
instructed, experienced only one short block of practice trials.
Also, unlike what we did for the monkeys, we presented humans
with the entire set of target stimuli in order to increase the
number of combinations and thus encourage them to apply
general feature-based strategies rather than specific S-R
associations. Also during each experimental session with
monkeys, behavioral data were collected by using one
randomly selected subset of stimuli, while human subjects
always faced all the 16 stimuli.
Color- and orientation-discrimination trials were presented in
both single- and mixed-task sequences. In single-task sequences,
the participants were required to perform the same task for
twenty-four consecutive trials before switching to the other,
competing task. On the contrary, in mixed-task sequences, the
feature guiding the selection of the motor response might change
on a trial-by-trial basis, thus including both trials in which subjects
had to switch from one task to the other (task-switch trials) and
trials in which they continued performing the same task (task-
repeat trials). Although not considered for statistical analyses, trials
in which monkeys broke eye fixation at any time after cue offset
(i.e., when the animal had already received the task instruction)
were discarded only after having sorted mixed-task trials into
‘‘task-switch’’ or ‘‘task-repeat’’ classes.
After an initial 700 ms interval during which central fixation
was required, the task cue appeared and remained visible for
700 ms. Then, subsequent to a randomly variable cue-stimulus
period (800, 1200 or 1600 ms), the target stimulus was presented
for 1000 ms or until the behavioral response. The task cue and
target stimuli were always presented at the fixation point location
(Figure 2). The inter-trial interval lasted 3 seconds. To note that
while in the monkeys eye fixation was monitored by means of the
scleral search coil method, no direct measure of eye fixation was
taken from the human participants, and they were simply asked to
maintain their gaze on the central fixation point for the entire
duration of each trial.
Statistical analyses. Task-switching costs and interference
costs were analyzed separately for humans, M1 and M2 by
performing 3-way repeated measures ANalyses Of VAriance
(ANOVA) on both error rate (ER) and reaction time (RT) data. A
26262 ANOVA with the factors sequence (single-task, mixed-task),
task (color, orientation) and stimulus congruency (congruent,
incongruent) was used to examine general costs. A 36262
ANOVA with the factors trial type (single-task, task-repeat, task-
switch), task and stimulus congruency was applied to analyze mixing
and switch costs. Interference costs were evaluated by examining
the main effect of the factor stimulus congruency. We used paired
samples T tests for post-hoc statistical evaluation.
Figure 1. Tables of S-R contingencies. A. Stimuli on gray background are incongruent; stimuli on white background are congruent; gray circle
and triangle are the symbolic cues instructing the color and orientation task, respectively. B. Subsets of stimuli used in monkey sessions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g001
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Results obtained from Monkey #1 (M1), Monkey #2 (M2) and
the human participants will be described separately, and they refer
to behavioral data collected during 82, 40 and 8 experimental
sessions, respectively. Data acquired from each human participant
were collected during a single experimental session.
As a first step, we looked for any inter-species difference in
overall behavioral performance by comparing error rate (ER) and
reaction times (RTs) of humans, M1 and M2 across all trials
through a one-way ANOVA (Figure 3). Humans were generally
more accurate than both M1 and M2 (mean ER=3.4% versus
11.6% and 18.2%, respectively; differences significant at
P,0.0001); humans were also significantly faster than M1 (mean
RT=644 ms versus 896 ms; P,0.0001) but slower than M2
(mean RT=644 ms versus 596 ms; P,0.01). In addition, M1 was
significantly more accurate but slower than M2 (mean
ER=11.6% versus 18.2%, mean RT=896 ms versus 596 ms;
differences significant at P,0.0001), perhaps reflecting a form of
speed-accuracy tradeoff in performance between the two animals.
Given this general behavioral pattern, we then examined
species-specific task-switching and interference costs, both in terms
of ER and RTs by performing the statistical analyses described in
the Methods section (table 1 summarizes the main behavioral
effects). Both monkeys performed the two tasks at different levels of
accuracy and speed (Figure 4). M1 was more accurate and faster
on orientation- than on color-discrimination trials (ER: 10.1%
versus 13%, F(1, 81)=5.1, P,0.05; RT: 864 ms versus 929 ms,
F(1, 81)=48.8, P,0.0001; Figure 4A), while M2 performed better
on color- than on orientation-discrimination trials (ER: 13.8%
versus 22.6%, F(1, 39)=25.1, P,0.0001; RT: 586 ms versus
606 ms, F(1, 39)=27.2, P,0.0001; Figure 4B). Since these
differences did not interact with any other factor in a substantial
and reliable fashion, behavioral costs related to congruency and
task switching effects for both monkeys are reported after
collapsing data from the two tasks.
Interference costs. Both humans and monkeys showed
significant interference costs (Figure 5). The congruency effect
was striking for M1 and M2, both in terms of ER difference
between congruent and incongruent trials (18.5%, F(1,
81)=399.7, P,0.0001, and 27.3%, F(1, 39)=487.9, P,0.0001,
respectively, for the two animals) and RT difference between the
same two conditions (109 ms, F(1, 81)=489.9, P,0.0001, and
57 ms, F(1, 39)=176.7, P,0.0001, respectively, for the two
animals). Human participants displayed a less dramatic but
nonetheless consistent interference cost in terms of ER (2.6%,
F(1, 7)=8.7, P,0.05), but were not significantly faster on
congruent than incongruent trials (637 ms versus 651 ms,
P=0.2). Interestingly, the magnitude of interference costs in the
form of ER differences appeared to be proportional to the species-
specific overall accuracy levels reported above: human
participants, who were overall more accurate than monkeys,
displayed lower congruency effects with respect to both M1 and
M2. Similarly, M2, whose general accuracy level was
comparatively poorer, paid the highest error interference cost
(differences significant at P,0.0001).
General costs. Both humans and monkeys showed highly
significant general costs in terms of ER, as previously defined
(humans: 2.7%, F(1, 7)=18.7, P,0.01; M1: 4.7%, F(1, 81)=46,7,
P,0.0001; M2: 2.9%, F(1, 39)=46.7, P,0.0001; Figure 6). Note
that, unlike interference costs, and despite dissimilarity between
species in overall accuracy, these ER costs were comparable (F(2,
127)=1.7, P=0.2). General cost in terms of RT differences was
significantly displayed by humans (67 ms, F(1, 7)=19.9, P,0.005)
and M1 (17 ms, F(1, 81)=6,9, P,0.01). M1 general cost on RTs
mainly concerned orientation-discrimination trials, as expressed by
the significant sequence by task interaction (F(1, 81)=11.9,
P=0.001) obtained for this animal. On the contrary, M2 was
not consistently faster on single-task compared to mixed-task trial
sequences (mean RT general cost=2 ms, F(1, 39)=0.7, P=0.4).
Remarkably, general and interference costs shown by monkeys
significantly interacted, especially when looking at accuracy (M1: F(1,
81)=58.3, P,0.0001; M2: F(1, 39)=48.0, P,0.0001). Specifically,
ER general costs for both M1 and M2 emerged robustly on
incongruent stimuli while ER on congruent stimuli was even slightly
higheronsingle-taskblockscomparedtomixed-taskblocks(Figure7).
M1 also showed a significant interaction between general and
interference costs in RTs, revealing a pattern of results consistent with
that just described for ER (F(1, 81)=52.6, P,0.0001).
Figure 2. Task design. A. Example of color-discrimination trial. B.
Example of orientation-discrimination trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g002
Figure 3. Overall behavioral performance of humans and
monkeys. A. Overall error rate. Humans (gray) are significantly more
accurate than monkeys (white). M1 is more accurate than M2
(differences significant at P,0.0001). B. Overall RTs. Humans and M2
are faster than M1 (P,0.0001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g003
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are specifically related to the difference in performance across
different trial types (single-task, task-repeat and task-switch trials)
were statistically evident as significant trial type main effects in both
humans (ER: F(2, 7)=17.6, P,0.001; RTs: F(2, 7)=16.8,
P,0.001) and monkeys (M1: ER, F(2, 81)=88.0, P,0.0001;
RTs, F(2, 81)=15.9, P,0.0001; M2: ER, F(2, 39)=52.9,
P,0.0001; RTs, F(2, 39)=189, P=0.8, n.s.). These task
switching costs are shown in Figure 8.
Paired T-test comparisons revealed that mixing cost was
expressed by humans as a significant RT difference between task-
repeat and single-task trials (51 ms, P,0.05). M1 showed a reliable
mixing cost both in terms of ER (3.9%, P,0.0001) and RTs (16 ms,
P,0.05). RT mixing cost for this monkey was particularly robust on
orientation discrimination trials (34 ms; significant trial type by task
interaction, F(2, 81)=7.5, P,0.01). Moreover, as already reported
for other results, responses of M1 to congruent stimuli were
curiously faster on task-repeat than on single-task trials (834 ms
versus 848 ms, P,0.05). M2 had no mixing cost at all.
Switch cost in ER was displayed by humans (3.2%, P,0.01),
M1 (4.3%, P,0.0001) and M2 (5.6%, P,0.0001). As in the case
of general costs, ER switch costs of monkeys were comparable to
those of humans (F(2, 127)=1.9, P=0.1). Switch cost in RTs was
observed only in humans (29 ms, P,0.05) and M1 (16 ms,
P,0.0001).
Similarly to general costs, switch costs depended on the response
conflict posed by the given stimuli (Figure 9). All subjects were
Table 1. Task switching costs of humans, M1 and M2.
Interference costs General costs Mixing costs Switch costs 1
st rep–2
nd rep
Errors (%) RTs (ms) Errors (%) RTs (ms) Errors (%) RTs (ms) Errors (%) RTs (ms) Errors (%) RTs (ms)
Humans 2.6 14* 2.7 67 1* 51 3.2 29 2.5 27*
M1 18.5 109 4.7 17 3.9 16 4.3 16 3.1 6*
M2 27.3 57 2.9 2* 0.6* 1.5* 5.6 20.2* 4.1 22*
*Statistically not significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.t001
Figure 5. Interference costs. Both species display consistent
interference costs. A. Humans are significantly less accurate on
incongruent than congruent trials. B. M1 is significantly less accurate
and fast on incongruent than congruent trials. (c) M2 is significantly less
accurate and fast on incongruent than congruent trials. [*=P,0.05;
**=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g005
Figure 4. Error rate and RT of monkeys on color- and
orientation-task trials. Monkeys perform the two tasks at a different
level of accuracy and speed. A. M1 is less accurate and fast on color-task
trials. B. M2 is less accurate and fast on orientation-task trials.
[*=P,0.05; **=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g004
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incongruent trials, as expressed by the significant trial type by
stimulus congruency interaction (humans: F(2, 7)=6.6, P,0.01); M1:
(F(2, 81)=96.2, P,0.0001); M2: (F(2, 39)=86.5, P,0.0001).
Furthermore, only M1 showed an increased switch cost for
incongruent trials in the form of slowed RTs (F(2, 81)=51.1,
P,0.0001).
Task repetition effect. A repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors task and trial repetition (1, 2 and 3, with 1 designating a
task switching trial) run on data collected on mixed-task
sequences showed a highly consistent effect of task repetition in
ER (humans: F(2, 7)=4.3, P,0.05; M1: F(2, 81)=13.6,
P,0.0001; M2: F(2, 39)=9.2, P,0.0001) (Figure 10). In
particular, the accuracy of both humans and monkeys
improved substantially from the switch trial to the first of a
sequence of task-repeat trials but did not significantly improve
thereafter (differences significant at P,0.05 for humans and at
P,0.0001 for M1 and M2). Although not significantly so, also
reaction times, at least those of humans and M1, became
generally shorter on the first post-switch trial, while they tended
to remain stable thereafter.
Discussion
The ability to swiftly and smoothly switch from one task set to
another requires high-level cognitive functions that are at the core
of executive control, and is a hallmark of intelligent behavior. An
animal model expressing such functions would be extremely
valuable for studying the neural basis of human complex behavior,
including at the cell-physiological level. In order to find out
whether non-human primates can approach this model, we
compared human and macaque monkey behavioral performance
on a task-switching paradigm.
A first remarkable result that we obtained pertains to overall
performance. We found that humans are generally more accurate
than macaques, probably suggesting that the paradigm we used
requires different levels of cognitive effort by the two species or, in
different words, that it challenges their cognitive capabilities to a
different degree. Moreover, although overall higher error rates in
M2 may perhaps be explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff in this
monkey (M2 was less accurate and faster than both M1 and
humans), the fact that M1 was both slower and less accurate than
humans supports the conclusion that the task was more difficult for
the monkeys than for the human participants, presumably
reflecting a difference in the amount of species-specific cognitive
resources. Task-switching and interference costs were thus
computed, allowing us to more directly reveal any interspecies
differences in critical components of central executive functions,
which in turn might be related to the above basic behavioral
dissimilarity.
Both species showed consistent interference costs in terms of
reduced accuracy for incongruent versus congruent conditions,
indicating that an inability to completely disable information that
is irrelevant to current goals might represent a critical limitation of
Figure 6. General costs. Both species show significant general costs.
A. Humans are significantly less accurate and fast on mixed-task than
single-task trials. B. M1 is significantly less accurate and fast on mixed-
task than single-task trials. C. M2 is significantly less accurate on mixed-
task than single-task trials. [*=P,0.05; **=P,0.005; ***=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g006
Figure 7. Interaction between interference costs and general
costs. Monkeys show significant sequence by stimulus congruency
interactions. A. ER and RT general costs of M1 are higher on
incongruent (triangles) than congruent (circles) trials. B. ER general
cost of M2 is higher on incongruent trials. [*=P,0.05; **=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g007
Monkey as a Model for Human Executive Control
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costs more markedly than humans, and also their response times
increased to a greater extent when processing stimuli associated
with two incompatible S-R mappings. This second-order behav-
ioral result, in conjunction with the observation that macaque
monkeys are generally more inaccurate than humans, suggests that
non-human primates have less control on selecting and pursuing a
specific course of action which is appropriate to the task at hand.
Performance effects typical of task-switching were detected in
both species; M1 and to some extent also M2 expressed behavioral
costs comparable to those observed in humans. Humans and
macaques paid similar costs if asked to perform two alternative
tasks along the same trial sequence rather than one and the same
task for many consecutive trials (general cost). Except for reaction
times of M2, which were not particularly affected by the type of
sequence, general costs shown by both species are indicative of
reduced cognitive efficiency resulting from the need to prepare for
shifting on request between two different task sets. In particular,
worsening of M1 and human performance on task-repeat trials
relative to single-task trials (mixing costs) strengthens the notion
that the executive system of primates has finite resources: the
cognitive load imposed by the mental operation of keeping more
than one task set simultaneously active in memory is sufficient to
make performance on task-repeat trials decline relative to single-
task trials. Indeed, although both monkeys and humans quickly
and substantially enhanced their performance immediately after a
switch trial, that is on the first task-repeat trial, they were still not
so proficient as on single-task blocks and did not further improve
as a function of task repetitions.
In addition to the latter costs due to sustained demands on
attentional control, producing global performance deficits, we
found that the dynamic process of rapid task set re-configuration
Figure 8. Switch and mixing costs. Both species show significant
switch costs (SC) and mixing costs (MC). A. Humans are significantly less
accurate and fast on task-switch than task-repeat trials (switch cost).
They are also less fast on task-repeat than on single-task trials (RT
mixing cost). B. M1 displays switch and mixing costs, in terms of both
accuracy and speed C. M2 shows significant ER switch cost. [*=P,0.05;
**=P,0.001; ***=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g008
Figure 9. Effects of interference costs on mixing and switch
costs. Monkeys show significant trial type by stimulus congruency
interactions. A. ER switch cost of humans is higher on incongruent
(triangles) than congruent (circles) trials. B. ER and RT mixing and switch
costs of M1 are higher on incongruent trials. C. ER switch cost of M2 is
higher on incongruent trials. [*=P,0.05; **=P,0.01; ***=P,0.001;
****=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g009
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human and monkey task-switching behavior. We underscore that
macaques displayed switch costs that are comparable in size to
those paid by humans, suggesting that they share the fundamental
limitations in executive control which typically make us humans
less accurate and prompt to respond on trials requiring a task
switch compared to task-repeat trials. Therefore it appears that
switch costs of monkeys, when conveniently characterized, provide
a valuable window onto human (and, by extension, primate)
transient control components, which are responsible for short-term
operations such as preparing the cognitive set specified at each
trial start by the instructional cue (endogenous control component)
and completing task set implementation after target stimulus
presentation, when all pertinent information has to be extracted in
order to finally release the appropriate motor response (exogenous
control component) [11].
Within the cognitive psychology literature, it has been
demonstrated that task set re-configuration cannot be entirely
achieved until exogenously triggered by stimulus attributes that are
associated with the current task [11,12]. In particular, even when
advance knowledge is provided and long cue-stimulus intervals are
allowed to adequately prepare for the upcoming task prior to
stimulus onset, switch RT costs are reduced but not completely
abolished. It has been proposed that this residual cost likely reflects
the time needed for instantiating exogenous control, and in
particular for selecting task-relevant stimulus features and
retrieving the appropriate S-R associations [11,35]. The observa-
tion that switch costs of both humans and macaques are
significantly affected by stimulus congruency appears to support
this general hypothesis, suggesting that exogenously triggered
executive functions are crucially involved in primate task-switching
operations. According to our results, switch costs paid by the two
species, especially in terms of increased error rates, are particularly
large when target stimuli are associated with two S-R mappings
prompting incongruent motor responses. In contrast, switch costs
are reduced or non-existent on trials entailing the retrieval of the
currently task-relevant association for congruent stimuli (Note 1).
This performance difference clearly denotes the incompleteness of
reconfiguration at the time of stimulus onset: conflicting S-R
mappings should interfere with residual switch costs as much as
response-compatible associations, if task set implementation had
already been accomplished endogenously. This result thus
confirms that stimulus congruity effects not only reveal the
persistence of the supposedly disengaged mapping, but may also
be informative about the primate exogenous control components
which allow selection of task-relevant stimulus features in task-
switching.
However, macaques seem to differ from humans at least in the
way interference effects interact with task switching-specific
behavioral costs. Contrary to humans, M1 and M2 also displayed
general costs interacting with stimulus congruency. Moreover, the
direction of costs was often peculiarly reversed on congruent trials,
i.e. performance was better on the condition which is supposed to
be the most difficult. For instance, macaques were paradoxically
more accurate or faster on congruent trials of a mixed-task block
than on the same congruent trials presented within a single-task
condition (see Figure 7). Likewise, the trial type-related pattern of
behavior they expressed on congruent trials is quite opposite to
expectations. Although differences are small or non-significant,
both M1 and M2 tended to perform worse on single-task trials
than on task-repeat trials and showed reversed switch costs (see
Figure 9). These peculiar results depend in all probability on the
basic inter-species difference in overall performance. Since the
task-switching paradigm we used exposes macaques to a higher
level of difficulty relative to humans, it is likely that especially the
mixed-task context elicits in monkeys a state of increased arousal,
such that their cognitive efficiency is enhanced compared to the
single-task condition. Within this context, it may happen that trials
involving congruent S-R mappings, which a priori should be
equally demanding within either trial sequence and should not
impose any additional load to the monkey executive system during
task-switching control operations, are curiously performed better
under conditions of elevated cognitive engagement.
In conclusion, macaque monkeys appear to match many aspects
of human task-switching, at least at the behavioral level. They pay
similar performance costs, revealing common psychological
limitations which in both species lead to interference effects on
Figure 10. Task repetition effect. Error rate and RTs of humans and
monkeys on switch (S), first task-repeat (1
st R) and second task-repeat
(2
nd R) trials. Both species substantially improve their performance from
the switch trial to the first of a series of task-repeat trials. (A) Humans;
(B) M1; (C) M2. [*=P,0.05; **=P,0.0001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021489.g010
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under contexts requiring dynamic goal-updating processes.
However, monkeys appear to be overall less competent than
humans in managing task-switching-like situations, suggesting that
their executive system is fundamentally more resource-limited.
Actually, even if one were to suppose that this represents an
important inter-species difference, the magnitude of task-switch-
ing-specific behavioral effects is comparable in macaques and
humans, indicating that they might depend on analogous cognitive
control components, but acting on different efficiency scales.
In contrast to our results, Stoet and Snyder [34], who focused
their study on trial-specific task-switching effects, did not report
any consistent switch cost in monkeys, suggesting that in these
animals, unlike humans, task sets can be completely reconfigured
prior to stimulus presentation. The authors of the study reported
evidence to suggest that switch costs could be obtained with
particularly short inter-trial intervals (170 ms). However, this is an
unlikely explanation for the robust switch costs we observed in
monkeys, since in the present experiment we used inter-trial
intervals of 3 seconds. Moreover, as they pointed out, the
increased flexibility they observed in monkeys cannot be a
function of training, since it has been demonstrated that humans
still pay switch costs after extensive practice sessions [36,37] and
our study shows that switch costs persist even in long-trained
monkeys.
We have no simple explanation for this apparent discrepancy in
results. Perhaps one possibility relates to a different training
strategy between our study and theirs, but at present this is only
speculative. It remains that in our hands the macaque monkey
provides an excellent model to study human task switching
performance, both at the behavioral and neurobiological level. We
can actually conceive that, although not necessarily sharing the
complex behavioral experiences of human individuals, non-human
primates exert cognitive control processes that may well approach
the human executive system.
Notes
Note 1. An alternative possibility is simply that congruent
stimuli do not provide an adequate test of task switching
performance. When a congruent stimulus is presented on the
occasion of a task-switch trial, the animal may even fail entirely to
switch to the newly relevant task and accordingly select the
relevant feature of the stimulus, and yet produce a correct motor
response for the simple reason that both features (and therefore
both tasks) require the same motor response. In other words, in the
case of congruent stimuli it is conceivable that a considerable
number of task-switch trials appear to be correct but should in fact
be classified as incorrect, had we a way to know that the animal
has performed the now irrelevant task.
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